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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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Until the late 1960s, the World Bank presented itself 
as an institution devoted to making sound and directly 
productive project loans. Yet, during its very early years, 
some discussions developed inside the Bank regarding the 
possibility of issuing different types of loans, namely (i) 
loans aimed at tackling social issues (“social loans”), and 
(ii) loans aimed at providing foreign currency to address 
disequilibria in the balance of payments (“impact loans”). 
This paper brings together historical analysis and theories 
of organization development to study the housing issue 
as a case in point. The analysis reveals that the Bank was 
unwilling to lend for housing programs not because these 
This paper—a product of the World Bank Archives and the Development Economics Vice Presidency—is part of a larger 
effort to use the Bank’s Archives to investigate the links between development economics and operational policy. Policy 
Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at 
Michele.Alacevich@unimi.it
were not sound—in fact, they were—but because they 
were geared toward achieving social welfare objectives 
and were not directly linked to productive investment 
projects, such as dams, power stations, and railroads. This 
early decision had a significant impact on the subsequent 
development of the Bank’s view of policy-making: it 
locked the institution into a particular lending pattern, 
and deprived it of important intellectual resources. It 
was not until the late 1960s that the Bank began to take 
social issues into consideration, rather late compared with 
other multilateral institutions.
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1. Introduction 
 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – since its 
beginnings known as the World Bank – was instituted at the 1944 Bretton Woods 
Conference with the principal purpose of aiding European reconstruction after 
World War II. The onset of the Cold War and the concomitant direct intervention 
by the U.S. in European reconstruction with the Marshall Plan, made the World 
Bank loans to European countries redundant – in fact useless – principally because 
of the much greater magnitude of the U.S. commitment: while the Bank’s loans in 
1947 totaled less than half a million dollars, the Marshall Plan brought to Europe 
around four billion dollars per year (Kapur, Lewis and Webb, 1997). 
The World Bank thus switched – much earlier than expected – to its second 
mission: promoting the development of poorer member countries. At a November 
1947 meeting of the Bank’s Executive Directors, the Bank’s President John McCloy 
predicted that “we are going to be driven into a very different field sooner than I 
thought, into the development field” (quoted in Kapur, Lewis and Webb, 1997, p. 
83). The problem was that there were no experts on development issues in the U.S. 
or in Europe at that time, let alone in the less developed countries. The lack of 
interest in such matters on the part of academia, and the virtual non-existence of 
most underdeveloped countries in the late 1940s – they were still dominions or 
colonies and had been studied only in respect to the developed economies (Meier 
and Seers, 1984) – meant that development issues were unknown terrain. 
Throughout 1948 and part of 1949 the Bank almost entirely ceased issuing loans, 
and its personnel and officials undertook an intense program of study and missions 
to underdeveloped member countries in order to collect data and information. 
Recollections of those years, including accounts by Bank officials who took part 
in those events (Knapp, 1975; Sommers, 1989), give rather cursory treatment to this 
transitional period, concentrating on the outcome of the transition itself. The Bank 
became an institution devoted to financing projects with infrastructural and 
productive purposes (e.g. power stations, dams, roads, and agricultural machinery). 
Yet the transitional period is worth analyzing as a crucial moment for the shaping 
and evolution of the Bank’s policies. Within the organization, different views about 
the role of the Bank as a development actor emerged. These views belonged to 
different individuals or groups; each of them had a different vision for the future of 
the Bank, or gave prominence to different aspects (e.g.  project lending vs. financial 
creditworthiness, vs. economic research). Leonard Rist, at that time the head of the 
Economic Department, pointed out many years later that the Bank’s policy “was not 
formulated. It was formed. It evolved. It resulted from events. And it changed with 
different loans. […] Policy formulations have been extremely rare” (Rist, 1961, p. 
47). It is thus interesting to examine the internal debate whereby these policies were 
formed, and to determine whether there were alternative policies which in fact lost 
out in the confrontation. As will become evident, alternative policies were explicitly 
discussed at the Bank, but they were set aside for a variety of reasons.  
Identifying the terms of the debate and understanding the reasons why certain 
views won over others can offer meaningful insights on the processes that shaped 
the political economy of the World Bank. Specifically, this is interesting because the 
vision that eventually emerged from the transition conditioned the subsequent 
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practices of the Bank, and gave it the traits of a conservative financial institution. 
From then, the Bank experienced long and sustained growth until the end of the 
1960s, which marked a decisive change of direction as a consequence of Robert S. 
McNamara’s appointment. To use Robert Asher’s metaphor (Asher, 1973), the 
leopard had changed its spots: no longer a simple bank, it had evolved into a 
development institution. 
Analyzing such a complex issue in its entirety would be beyond the scope of this 
paper. The paper focuses on the Bank’s activities related to housing because the 
issue was of primary importance in the internal debates between the 1940s and the 
1950s, and it became again a priority in McNamara’s agenda. I analyze such activities 
through the lens of historical analysis and organization theory. It should be noted 
that archival holdings cover other topics in a very uneven way; for example, there 
are only a few useful documents on education, water and sanitation for those years.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the Bank’s first 
encounter with housing and urban development issues. Section 3 reviews the Bank’s 
internal debates on these issues and their eventual practical outcomes. Section 4 
considers the usefulness of focusing on the early years of an institution’s life for 
understanding its subsequent path of development. Section 5 offers some 
concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. The ILO and the Housing Issue at the World Bank 
 
The idea that the World Bank would offer loans for urban development and housing 
had arisen within the Bank itself – more precisely, as will be shown below, within its 
early missions to less developed member countries. But as a matter of fact, the 
institution which first sponsored the issue was not the World Bank, but the 
International Labour Organization. 
ILO’s Building, Civil Engineering and Public Works Committee had met for its 
Second Session in Rome from 16 to 25 March 1949. On that occasion, the Italian 
employers’ delegate, with the support of the delegates of the French and the Italian 
governments, suggested that the ILO investigate the possibility of establishing a 
completely new institution – the International Institute for Building Loans – under 
the control of the two Bretton Woods institutions, the IBRD and the IMF. 
According to a subcommittee’s minutes, “the function of the proposed institute 
would be to collect private savings by the issue of bonds in countries where such 
savings exist, with a view to making mortgage loans for housing construction, 
especially for the lower-income groups” (ILO, 1949a, p. 9). The main purpose of 
this proposal was to sustain and stabilize employment, firstly by stimulating an 
important labor-using activity, and secondly by promoting a better distribution of 
labor among countries. As regards this latter point, it was stressed that the project 
would favor migration from countries with surpluses of population to those with 
deficits (ibid., p. 10). 1 
                                                 
1 Government delegates from Eastern European countries opposed the proposal, thus provoking a 
split among trade unions delegates: those representing Communist trade unions opposed the 
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The Resolution was adopted on 25 March, and the ILO Governing Body was 
invited to contact the IBRD (ILO, 1949c). This it did one month after Eugene Black 
took over the presidency of the IBRD.2 The matter was thus immediately passed to 
the Bank’s Economic Department for preliminary examination. The Economic 
Department, under the direction of Leonard Rist, discussed two separate matters: 
first, whether housing could be considered a sufficiently “productive” project, as 
required by Article I(i) of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement; and, second, whether 
there was any rationale for the Bank to contribute with loans in U.S. currency to 
projects whose outlays would principally be in local currency.3 
As for the first issue, the answer was quite clear: the Bank’s “productivity” 
requirement would certainly not be met in every country, “but no doubt, there were 
areas where the housing shortage seriously hampered the development of new 
resources and industries, so that financing of new houses would in those areas be 
directly productive even within a narrow understanding of that term.” 
As for the second point, the analysis was more complicated, not least because it 
was impossible to understand, at that very preliminary stage, what possibilities were 
being considered by the ILO. The Bank focused on three. 
The possibility considered most likely by the Economic Department was that a 
new Institute for Building Loans would sell bonds in the private markets of capital-
exporting countries, under guarantees by the IBRD. In this case, the problem would 
arise that the proceeds were mostly in U.S. currency, while the housing projects 
would mostly require local currency. The Economic Department assumed that this 
extra U.S. currency would be added to the general foreign currency resources of the 
borrowing country as a supplement “necessary to absorb the inflationary pressure 
created by increased construction activity.” 
A second possibility was that the Bank would guarantee not the bonds 
themselves, but the monetary policy of the government hosting the building 
investment. The Bank would intervene to persuade potential local investors to buy 
the proposed Institute’s bonds in the local market, offering a guarantee by the IBRD 
against losses due to devaluations of the local currency. The underlying idea was that 
the Bank’s direct involvement—that is, its authority and control—would “keep the 
local government in line.” 
A less likely third possibility was that the Bank would participate merely by 
lending its prestige and experience, without any formal guarantees on the Institute’s 
bonds. 
Although these three scenarios—and principally the first of them—were at odds 
with the Bank’s previous loan policy (which had principally consisted of directly 
providing foreign currency for reconstruction programs), the Articles of Agreement 
envisaged the possibility that, “if the project gives rise indirectly to an increased need 
for foreign exchange by the member in whose territory the project is located,” the 
                                                                                                                                    
proposal or abstained, while those representing Catholic or otherwise “Atlantic seaboard” trade 
unions—as the Belgian Workers’ delegate put it (ILO, 1949a, p. 6)—were in favor (ILO, 1949b). 
2 David A. Morse to Eugene R. Black, 12 August 1949, Housing and Urban Development, Vol. 1, 
Central Files, Fonds 2, World Bank Group Archives (henceforth Housing 1). 
3 These remarks, and those of the next several paragraphs, draw on an internal Economic 
Department memorandum: Svend Andersen, Economic Department, General Studies, “An 
International Institute for Building Loans,” 26 August 1949, Housing 1. 
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Bank might provide that additional foreign currency (Article IV, Section 3 (c)). In 
such cases, unlike its usual project loans, the Bank was allowed to disburse loans that 
would help countries in trouble with their own balance of payments due to the 
financing of a local project in local currency. The Economic Department therefore 
advised that the matter should be investigated further, asking the ILO to specify the 
nature of the involvement required from the Bank.4 
 
 
3. The World Bank’s Internal Deliberations on the Housing Issue 
 
3.1. The Bank’s Disengagement 
 
Contacts between the ILO and the Bank continued for a while, but the Institute for 
Building Loans never came into being. This was partly due to conflicts within the 
ILO itself, principally among country representatives on the one side, and the 
internal technical staff on the other.5 The ILO staff, in fact, was highly skeptical that 
such a huge new institution was feasible, or that it could find resources to finance 
housing projects, or that the Bank could sponsor it on the basis of the ILO 
Committee’s resolution. The country representatives, by contrast, expressed the 
need of many governments to cope with reconstruction or social problems, or both, 
and saw a new institution headed by the IBRD as a means to channel resources into 
the housing sector. The “housing shortage” was a widely discussed problem, and 
many proposals for programs or institutions to finance housing were put forward at 
least until the mid-1950s.6 
The World Bank, for its part, managed to avoid any commitment to housing 
projects.7 As the Bank’s president Eugene Black explained to his ILO counterpart, 
David Morse, it was a strict rule of the Bank that loans in foreign currency should be 
used only to finance the cost of imported goods and services, and they could not be 
diverted to the financing of local expenditures.8 Moreover, a more general rule was 
that the Bank’s loans should be for directly productive purposes. As Richard 
Demuth, then head of the Technical Assistance and Liaison Staff Office, put it: “the 
first test of any project to be financed by the Bank is its productivity,” and housing’s 
relation to productivity seemed too remote.9 The Bank’s Vice President Robert 
                                                 
4 Svend Andersen to Leonard B. Rist, “ILO – Proposal for an International Institute for Building 
Loans,” 25 August 1949, Housing 1. 
5 Walter Hill to Robert L. Garner, Report H 105, “Conversation with ILO Staff in Geneva Relating 
to the Suggested Creation, under the Control of IBRD, of an International Institute for Building 
Loans,” Paris, 17 October 17 1949, Housing 1. 
6 For example an International Loan Bank for Building, by the International Federation of Building 
Trade Employers and Civil Engineering Contractors in October 1951; a European Credit Institute 
for Housing, by the Council of Europe’s Consultative Assembly in December 1951; a report by the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe on methods and techniques of financing housing 
in various European countries, which aroused interest in the other two UN regional Economic 
Commissions, namely ECLA and ECAFE; see Ernest Weissmann to Davidson Sommers, 9 January 
1952, Housing 1. 
7 See, for example, Walter Hill to Leonard B. Rist, January 17, 1951, Housing 1. 
8 Eugene R. Black to David A. Morse, December 13, 1949, Housing 1. 
9 Richard H. Demuth, “Financing of Housing,” May 22, 1952, Housing 1. 
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Garner, a few months later, emphasized the same concept: “The Bank should 
concentrate its efforts on projects which will yield the greatest and quickest increase 
in output and productivity. As a rule, projects for municipal improvement do not 
meet this test.”10 Projects that most contributed to increased output and 
productivity were thus deemed – as many Bank documents reported – bankable or 
sound, and no further elaboration was made on the criteria at the basis of the 
distinction between sound and unsound projects. In the words of Mason and Asher: 
“the early literature of the Bank is full of references to ‘sound’ economic policies
‘sound’ fiscal and monetary policies, and ‘sound’ policies of various other kin
the clear implication that the distinction between sound and unsound policies is as 
obvious as the distinction between day and night. The distinction is not always 
perfectly clear, however, and, in such cases, those to whom it is crystal clear se
irritatingly doctrinaire” (Mason and Asher, 1973, p. 186, italics in the
, 
ds, with 
em 
 original). 
                                                
This blurred distinction between sound and unsound, and the perception that it 
was doctrinaire, was also due to the blurred view of economists observing the 
Bank’s policies and directions. For example, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan criticized the 
Bank because – in his opinion – it did not sufficiently emphasize the importance of 
the so-called Social Overhead Capital, which would have made indivisibilities 
affordable, and would have permitted externalities, balanced growth, and a planning 
approach; on the opposite side of the spectrum, Albert Hirschman criticized the 
Bank because it concentrated its investments in fields (transportation and power) 
which Hirschman considered the core of Social Overhead Capital.11 
The Bank was somewhat detached from these debates: it privileged loans for 
single and well-defined specific projects – even though its publications used to pay 
tribute to the rhetoric of plan – regardless of whether they would fit in the category 
of Social Overhead Capital. What mattered for the Bank was that its loans should 
yield a fast and high increase in output and productivity to repay the debt. The 
implicit assumption of the Bank’s top management was that a causal link existed 
between economic growth and modernization of a country. In fact, by lending for 
projects that met the so-called productivity test,  
 
we believe we can most effectively assist our member countries to develop new 
sources of wealth and income which would enable them to provide out of their 
own resources better municipal services, better housing, better health and 
education – in fact, all of the fruits of greater economic productivity.12 
 
Hence, the Bank granted no loans to finance activities in the fields of housing, 
town planning and building materials.13 Only two loans concerned, among other 
 
10 Robert L. Garner to Emilio Toro, April 21, 1953, in Lauchlin Bernard Currie Papers, Rare Book, 
Manuscripts, and Special Collections Library, Duke University, Durham, NC (henceforth LBCP). 
11 For Rosenstein-Rodan’s and Hirschman’s elaboration on the related concepts of “Social Overhead 
Capital” and “directly productive investments” or “Directly Productive Activities” see Rosenstein-
Rodan, 1950, 1961a, 1984, and Hirschman, 1958. For their criticism of the Bank lending preferences, 
see Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961b and Hirschman, 1958, p. 83. 
12 Robert L. Garner to Emilio Toro, April 21, 1953, LBCP. 
13 Housing was eventually considered in 1960 when the Bank established its so-called “soft window”, 
that is the International Development Association, which would make loans for “low-yielding and 
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things, building activities. In the case of a reconstruction loan made to the 
Netherlands in 1947, some resources were used to finance the importing of 
materials used for housing. In the Netherlands, in fact, replacement of workmen’s 
houses destroyed during the war “was a step necessary for the rehabilitation of 
Dutch industries essential to the national economy.”14 In the case of a loan made in 
1952 to improve Iceland’s agricultural production, some resources were used for the 
construction of farm buildings (IBRD, 1952a). However, since Iceland had to 
import almost all its building materials, this loan was considered consistent with the 
rule that only the foreign exchange requirements of a project could be financed. 
With the exception of these two loans, building activities were in practice ruled out 
of consideration by the Bank, except residually, as for example in the case of the 
settling of a construction camp at the site of a dam project. 
 
3.2. Internal Discussions at the Bank: Impact Loans and Social Loans 
 
Nevertheless, discussion on the issue had not ceased at the Bank. In fact, it 
concentrated on two different proposals: for so-called impact loans and for social 
loans. 
The first internal discussion focused on what the Economic Department had 
already argued regarding the ILO proposal: that even in the case of mainly local 
currency needs, a hard currency loan (i.e. in dollars) could prove useful in tackling 
balance of payments pressures deriving from local expenditures. This was what 
came to be called an impact loan, that is, a loan made not to sustain a specific 
project, but to counteract the subsequent inflationary impact of this project on the 
entire country’s economy. 
This effect had been fully acknowledged by the Bank’s Fifth Annual Report. This 
document discussed at length the possibility that local expenditure on labor or on 
domestically produced equipment could give rise to increased demand for imported 
consumer goods or raw materials, or, in the Report’s terms, to “foreign exchange 
requirements indirectly resulting from expenditures in local currency” (IBRD, 1950, 
p. 10). In this case, a loan from the Bank would be perfectly legitimate if was 
intended to tide a country over a period of expansion without inflation. 
This analysis was based on ideas arising from the work of Paul Rosenstein-
Rodan, then a member of the Bank’s Economic Department, on the loan 
application submitted by the Italian government to the Bank at the end of 1948 for 
the development of Southern Italy. The Italian government, in fact, had the means 
to undertake an investment program whose capital equipment would be provided 
from domestic sources, but it lacked large reserves of foreign currency. In that 
situation, Rosenstein-Rodan predicted, the increased income resulting from the 
investment program would generate increased demand that would either create 
additional demand for imports or a reduced supply of exports. In both cases, the 
country would be subject to inflationary pressure and would need a greater amount 
of foreign currency. Making this additional foreign currency available should be the 
                                                                                                                                    
slow-yielding projects in such fields as health, education, and housing” (Mason and Asher, 1973, p. 
381). 
14 A. S. G. Hoar to Jacob L. Crane, April 21, 1952, Housing 1. 
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Bank’s task. The loans would thus “finance the impact of an investment program 
which the Italian government undertakes” (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961b, p. 14). The 
loan to Italy proved successful, but it was not repeated: “it was contrary to many 
people’s thinking, notably to […] the most conservative business thinking in the 
Bank” (ibid., p. 13). 
The second discussion, complementary to the first, developed from the 
experience of the first comprehensive survey missions undertaken in less developed 
member countries. These missions recognized from first-hand observation of the 
social and economic conditions of the countries visited that not only directly 
productive, but even directly social, interventions were indispensable for a sustained 
process of development. This process would change sectoral growth rates, the 
structures of demand and supply, and the growth rates of urban and rural 
populations, thus placing the social structure of countries already facing profound 
social hardship under great strain. 
The Cuba mission of 1950, for example, recommended that urgent action be 
taken to greatly increase the supply of drinking water to the city of Santiago, which 
was at risk of humanitarian disaster (IBRD, 1951). The Jamaica mission urged the 
replacement of almost 30 percent of the houses on the island (IBRD, 1952b), while 
the Nicaragua mission opened its final report by declaring that “expenditures to 
improve sanitation, education and public health should, without question, be given 
first priority [for] the development of the Nicaraguan economy” (IBRD, 1953, p. 
22). 
Particularly relevant to the present discussion is the rehabilitation program for the 
slums of the city of Barranquilla, Colombia, proposed to IBRD in 1952 by Lauchlin 
B. Currie, who had headed the Bank’s 1949 comprehensive survey mission to that 
country, and in 1952 was an economic advisor to the Colombian government. The 
bulk of the program consisted of a housing program with two purposes: to upgrade 
living conditions in the Barranquilla area called the Zona Negra, “probably the worst 
slum in Colombia,”15 and to stimulate economic growth through an investment 
program in a sector—building—which could expand largely without depressive 
effects.16 
Lauchlin Currie would propose his Leading Sector model only in the 1970s—
significantly, the model identifies building as one such leading sector—yet the 
mechanism, if not the label, was already operative in the Barranquilla housing 
program. His 1974 reflections on the building sector are therefore pertinent to the 
discussion: 
 
The import component is low. The unskilled labor component is relatively high. 
The need it serves is so compelling that in the United States and Canada, despite 
the high level of incomes, ‘home operations’ still capture about 30% of disposable 
income. The stock of houses is so large that a relatively small addition should have 
little effect on prices […]. It is true that the stock is not so great in a developing 
country but this is more than offset by the high growth rate of urban population 
and the desirability of replacing extensive slum areas. (Currie, 1974, p. 7) 
 
                                                 
15 Emilio Toro to Robert L. Garner, April 7, 1953, LBCP. 
16 For more thorough discussion of the Barranquilla case, see Alacevich (2005). 
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Currie was not satisfied by explanations of poverty and the vicious circle of poverty 
in less developed countries couched in terms of a general scarcity of capital, or by 
solutions that relied on a general process of growth to move the entire economy 
upward. Rather, he proposed removing obstacles to sectors whose demand was 
potentially large but latent and which could achieve sustained growth “independently 
of the overall rate of growth of the economy” (ibid., p. 6). These two conditions 
identified a sector that could transmit its own independent upward movement to 
other sectors, thus leading the economy through a process of sustained growth. 
Moreover, this process could be triggered and driven by addressing social items 
on the development agenda, for example dwelling renewal. In his advice on 
Colombia, Lauchlin Currie was reviving his pre-war endeavor to reconcile “the 
humanitarian and social aims of the New Deal [with] sound economics.”17 
 
3.3. The Bank’s Rejection of Impact Loans and Social Loans 
 
However, neither the concept of impact loans nor the possibility of matching social 
aims with sound economics changed the Bank’s position. The social prescriptions 
advanced by the missions to Cuba, Jamaica, and Nicaragua were ignored by the 
Bank, and it did not participate in the Barranquilla program. 
This was for three main reasons. The first was that it was necessary to convince 
U.S. investors that the Bank was creditworthy, and that its bonds—its main source 
of funds—were sound (Oliver, 1995). This was an exogenous and compelling reason 
that goes some way toward explaining the propensity to manage the institution 
cautiously. Yet, it is not sufficient to explain why possibly sound investments were 
avoided (housing, for example), and in general why no consideration was made of 
solutions that, within the frame of a general soundness principle, could tackle both 
economic and social issues. 
Therefore, one must also consider a second reason, namely that the top 
management of the Bank—the Presidents and their closest staff— came from Wall 
Street (Kraske, 1996), and it was in the culture and in the interests of their social 
milieu to conceive the Bank as strictly a bank: that is, a sound, conservative 
institution whose investments should “yield the greatest and quickest increase in 
output and productivity.”18 John McCloy, the second President of the World Bank, 
was a New York lawyer well acquainted with Wall Street conservative circles. 
According to Kraske, McCloy was determined to transform the Bank into a 
“financially sound lending institution […] The criteria that were to determine the 
conduct of its business were to be acceptable to Wall Street” (Kraske, 1996, p. 53). 
Several contemporaries of McCloy were of the same mind: in discussing Bank loans 
                                                 
17 Lauchlin B. Currie to Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Memorandum on Full Employment,” 18 March 
1940, quoted in Barber (1996, p. 130). This is the principal reason why Currie was been considered a 
pioneer by many economists who, in the 1960s and ‘70s, advocated a shift from the idea of 
development as maximization of economic growth to a broader definition that encompassed social 
issues, such as basic needs or redistribution policies. In “The Objectives of Development,” written at 
the invitation of Paul Streeten, Currie (1978) provides an overview of his pioneering ideas. 
18 Robert L. Garner to Emilio Toro, April 21, 1953, LBCP. The broader scenario for this point, 
which merits much closer attention than is possible here, is the resumption of direct political 
responsibilities (because of the needs of the war economy) by the US business community, which had 
been relegated to peripheral positions during the years of the New Deal (Maier, 1977). 
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to Chile, the U.S. Ambassador in Chile wrote to President Truman that “our 
enemies are […] charging that the International Bank is under the domination of 
Wall Street and that we are back to Dollar Diplomacy with the Good Neighbor 
Policy scrapped.”19 Robert Garner was recommended for the position of Bank’s 
Vice President by Harold Stanley, one of the two associates of Morgan Stanley 
(Garner, 1972, p. 206), and Eugene Black, who ruled the Bank until the early 1960s, 
had been a Vice President at Chase National Bank. Black wanted either Douglas 
Dillon or David Rockefeller, both exponents of the élite of the American financial 
establishment, as his successors. This did not happen, but George Woods, who took 
his place in 1963, had until then been chairman of First Boston Corporation. 
The third reason was that the first development loans proved very successful in 
that they were almost completely repaid. Although Bank disbursements to member 
countries increased from 250 million in 1947 to 708.8 in 1963, at the end of Black’s 
presidency, net transfers (i.e. disbursements minus repayment of capital and interest) 
followed an opposite trend, and at the end of the 1960s they were even negative.20 
When Woods became the Bank’s fourth President, the Bank’s profits were growing 
“at an almost indecent rate” (Mason and Asher, 1973, p. 407). Hence there was no 
reason, from the point of view of conservative bankers at least, to change policy. 
 
 
4. Persistence and Change in the History of an Institution 
 
4.1. The Establishment and Consequences of Strategic Visions in Formative Periods  
 
This brief historical reconstruction has shown that the World Bank was involved 
with the housing problem from very early on in its history. It was involved in 
analysis of the issue conducted externally by the ILO Committee, and internally 
both by the Economic Department, which devised a loan pattern that would include 
housing loans, and by the missions to less developed countries, which proposed that 
traditionally bankable loans should be linked with social loans. 
However, the Bank did not take up those proposals, and decided to grant loans 
only for directly productive purposes. Since this policy yielded high returns, it seems 
coherent to propose a functionalist explanation for what happened: there was a well-
defined situation with certain constraints (funding, for example), and the institution 
developed a perfectly efficient solution for it. 
The paper has provided evidence that this kind of explanation misrepresents the 
historical record. In actual fact, there were more than one option, and none of them 
was intrinsically in conflict with the others. For reasons that were not exclusively 
economic, the institution opted for one particular solution to the exclusion of the 
others, thus establishing a pattern that would be pursued long afterward. 
The sociology of organizations has a well-established tradition of studies that 
analyze the mechanisms underlying the dynamics described above. Among these 
mechanisms, the most relevant here are the relations among different subjects and 
                                                 
19 Quoted in Kraske (1996, p. 60). 
20 Data are from Table 7-1. World Bank Loans and IDA Credits by Fiscal Years through June 30, 1971, in 
Mason and Asher 1973, p. 192, and Table 7-8. Flow of World Bank Funds, by Type of Flow and Country 
Group, Fiscal Years 1947-70, in Mason and Asher (1973, p. 219). 
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groups within institutions, the definition and reproduction of the character and 
mission of institutions, the shaping of specific configurations through these 
interrelations, and their consequences on the future development of an institution.21 
In his classic study of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), for example, Philip 
Selznick showed how the TVA leadership was unable to preserve the idea of 
democratic planning that inspired the TVA’s foundation, and how the leadership’s 
legitimacy was called into question by an internal group that progressively acquired 
control over the organization and eventually managed to impose its own ideology 
and its commitments to a distinct political constituency (Selznick, [1949] 1966). 
Beyond the specific case under examination, Selznick underlined the importance of 
internal interactions and behavior of groups and individuals to understand how an 
institution changes over time. Tensions arise between the management, which 
defines a strategic vision and tries to impose it, and “the individuals within the 
system [who] tend to resist being treated as means. They interact as wholes, bringing 
to bear their own special problems and purposes” (Selznick, [1949] 1966, p. 251). 
Likewise, Herbert Simon stressed the need for the leadership to define and 
enforce a clear mission that functions as a catalyst for the whole organization. 
Simon’s elaborations well complement Selznick’s. Analyzing the establishment of 
the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA),22 Simon noted how the most 
urgent problem for the ECA top management was to create a homogeneous 
environment that would enable the organization to function and would make the 
decision-making process sufficiently smooth. Simon described “a power struggle in 
which ideas – in particular the conception of the program – played a major role” 
(Simon, [1953] 1976, p. 323). This struggle ended only when the top management 
eventually shaped the organization’s basic principles and had them accepted 
internally. It was, in Simon’s words, a “representation-seeking process;” only when 
“a consensus [was] reached on a suitable representation, did the organization of the 
Economic Cooperation Administration take definite form” (Simon, [1947] 1976, p. 
xxxix). Only those units and individuals who adhered to these principles and this 
representation flourished; opponents were marginalized and even ousted. 
These considerations are in line with Mark Granovetter’s thesis that organizations 
acquire a particular shape for reasons that have to do with social dynamics—
Granovetter stresses networks—and that their further evolution depends on that 
particular shape (Granovetter, 1990). It is for this reason that the formative periods 
of institutions, and by extension the turning points in their history, are so important: 
from uncertain conditions, a shape progressively acquires solidity and becomes less 
subject to mutations. This shape influences the subsequent institutional 
development and determines a sort of institutional path dependence—in the words 
of Paul David (1994, p. 208), the “persisting consequences of some aleatory and 
transient conditions that prevailed early in the history of the process.” In his study 
of ECA, Simon assigned a central role to individual ideas: “in its formative stages 
the organization consisted largely of a series of pictures in the minds of different 
people. These several pictures were far from congruent with each other, and the 
                                                 
21 The terms “organization” and “institution” are contiguous in meaning, but the latter implies “that 
we are going to pay some attention to [an organization’s] history and to the way it has been 
influenced by the social environment” (Selznick, [1957] 1984, p. 6). 
22 ECA was the US Federal agency in charge of administering the Marshall Plan. 
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process of organizing consisted in considerable measure in arriving at a single 
picture that was held more or less in common” (Simon, [1953] 1976, p. 315). From 
that point on, the institution entered a phase of growth and stability. 
This historical reconstruction of the housing issue at the Bank proves many 
mechanisms highlighted by the literature on organizations. The housing issue 
triggered a remarkable amount of reflections within the Bank, which eventually 
focused on the rationale for Bank loans, and on the concepts of impact and social 
loans. The Economic Department had a very open approach to different scenarios 
for lending. More specifically, within the Economic Department Paul Rosenstein-
Rodan emphasized the need to strengthen long-term overall plans; he also 
encouraged impact loans to counteract disequilibria in the balance of payments. At 
the same time, the Bank’s overseas missions emphasized the need to enlarge the 
scope of Bank lending to include housing and other social issues. However, the 
Bank’s top management moved along different lines, emphasizing soundness and a 
focus on projects, and rejecting – or at least not endorsing – different approaches. 
In this phase, the Bank consisted of different pictures in the minds of different 
people. As the various approaches, or pictures, took shape, the top management 
made sure they would not inform the overall conduct of the Bank, and dissenting 
opinions were silenced. Lauchlin Currie left to advise the Colombian government in 
the early 1950s. In 1953 Paul Rosenstein-Rodan went to MIT, “to the academic 
world, where,” in the words of the Bank’s vice-president Robert Garner (1961, p. 
98), “[…] his talents lie.” Even more significantly, the Economic Department 
headed by Leonard Rist was disbanded in 1952 (Oliver, 1975). In the senior 
management’s opinion, “the Bank was not the place for the development of broad 
economic policies or studies” (Garner, 1961, p. 98). Most importantly, the 1952 
reorganization excluded the Economics Department from the decision-making 
process on loans. Before the 1952 reorganization, the Economic Department had 
had a veto power over the decision of granting a loan to a country; after the 
reorganization, it maintained only consultative functions, and became a service to 
other operational departments.23 Using Simon’s metaphor, it could be said that the 
Bank’s top managers had in their mind the picture of a bank, not of a development 
agency; they worked accordingly – and successfully – to preserve that picture. 
The early exclusion of impact loans and social loans from the range of the Bank’s 
possible interventions, and strict adherence to the features typical of a bank with no 
concession made to more flexible patterns of lending, affected the institution’s 
subsequent development and characteristics, eventually preventing it from taking 
further steps in comprehension of the mechanisms and of the many facets of the 
modernization process in developing countries. When, during the 1960s, the entire 
community of development scholars and practitioners began to criticize the 
development creed hitherto followed, the World Bank was lagging behind. While, at 
the beginning of the 1970s, David Morse—still head of ILO—spoke of 
“dethronement of the GNP” (1971, p. 7), referring to what was by then the 
widespread  belief that reliance on economic growth alone was not sufficient to 
achieve real and effective development, and on various occasions had even led to 
                                                 
23 For a historical analysis of the 1952 reorganization, see Alacevich, 2009 forthcoming; for a 
functionalist analysis, à la Chandler, see Galambos and Milobsky, 1995. 
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unexpected negative results (see for example Singer, 1965; Seers, 1969; ul Haq, 
1971), a World Bank official had to admit that “we [at the Bank] know more about 
the cost effectiveness of alternate production techniques of motor boats than we do 
of teaching reading or delivering prenatal care” (Simmons, 1974, p. 50). Somewhat 
paradoxically, the World Bank was paying for having found an internal equilibrium 
that was no longer under discussion. 
 
4.2. Path Dependence and Change 
 
So far I have described a pattern whose main engine is institutional path 
dependence. When the formative phase has ended and an institution has acquired a 
shared picture of its own mission, subsequent developments are consistent with the 
prevailing vision, and they reinforce it. It is now worth considering institutional 
change. Path dependence of course does not exclude change, but perhaps it 
influences the nature of change: the more path dependence inhibits initial change, 
the more change erupts suddenly and abruptly when it has accumulated sufficient 
energy to break the constraints of path dependence. 
In the past 35 years, evolutionary theories have explained change as 
discontinuous development, where one can see at work both mechanisms of path 
dependence and sudden and unexpected changes. Old evolutionary biology theory 
was dominated by phyletic gradualism. It held that evolution occurs as a slow and 
steady transformation, which, in the long run, would produce new species. Instead, 
the theory of punctuated equilibrium proposed by Eldredge and Gould in 1972 
holds that evolution occurs through rapid and concentrated changes dotted along 
long static phases. As Eldredge and Gould put it: “ the history of evolution is not 
one of stately unfolding, but a story of homeostatic equilibria, disturbed only ‘rarely’ 
[…] by rapid and episodic events of speciation” (1972, p. 84). 
This pattern, of course, is not new to social sciences, but punctuated equilibrium 
has become a prominent model to investigate organizational change (Gersick 1991). 
Tushman and Romanelli, for example, state that “organizations evolve through 
convergent periods punctuated by strategic reorientations (or recreations) which 
demark and set bearings for the next convergent period” (1985, p. 171). This model 
helps in visualizing why the emphasis on the formative period for the subsequent 
path dependent development of an institution is not at odds with sudden changes 
that have no apparent relation with any path predictability. In the case of the World 
Bank, the strong stability experienced under Black’s presidency was suddenly 
disrupted by the strategic reorientation operated by McNamara. Far from 
invalidating path dependence mechanisms, sudden change appears as a consequence 
of them. 
The early exclusion of approaches to lending policies other than those favored by 
Black and his top managers caused the Bank to be lacking the expertise needed to 
take the lead in the broad discussions and renewal processes that were boiling in the 
development field. It was no accident that Robert McNamara’s attempt to give the 
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institution a new direction involved criticism of the previous creed24 and the 
recruitment of a new generation of development scholars: in primis Hollis Chenery, 
and then Mahbub ul Haq, Frances Stewart, Paul Streeten, Shahid Burki, Norman 
Hicks, and others. 
Chenery revived the Bank’s Economic Department, and established collaboration 
between the Bank and the Institute for Development Studies of Sussex University, 
whose analyses were collected in the volume Redistribution with Growth (Chenery et al., 
1974). The group that gathered around Paul Streeten began to work with the ILO, 
importing from it the stimulus to study the basic needs approach25 and proposing its 
own original contributions (see Streeten et al., 1981; Hicks, 1979, 1982; Hicks and 
Streeten, 1979; Burki and ul Haq, 1981; Stewart, 1985). Communication between the 
ILO and the World Bank on basic needs resulted in a number of joint missions (ul 
Haq, 1981; Kapur, Lewis and Webb, 1997, p. 255). The question of whether 
McNamara actually achieved positive results in poverty reduction is beyond the 
scope of the present discussion, but the change in perspective of the McNamara 
years is undeniable. 
Interestingly for the case analyzed in this paper, McNamara further widened the 
Bank’s agenda by providing it with an Urban Development Department and an 
Urban Poverty Task Group, both headed by Edward Jaycox. This initiative was 
perceived as a novelty within the institution. As a Bank’s programmatic sector 
working paper stated in 1972, “the proliferation of squatter settlements and slums, 
and the rising backlog in urban services, have been accompanied by growing 
recognition that ‘development’ implies much more than just expansion of output. 
[…]. In recognition of the importance of these issues, the World Bank recently 
decided to supplement its activities in individual sectors with a more direct focus on 
problems of urbanization. […] This is a new field for the Bank” (World Bank, 1972, 
p. 3). The focus was heavily on housing, because of its importance to development 
“in both economic and welfare terms” (World Bank, 1975, p. 10). From 1972 to 
1981, 58 percent of the urban projects, representing 46 percent of the urban lending, 
were for housing (Kapur, Lewis and Webb, 1997, p. 317).26 Since the early 1970s, 
urban development, and more specifically housing, have become an integral part of 
the Bank’s research and lending activities (for a far-reaching analysis over time, one 
can follow Michael Cohen’s work through several publications over the decades, for 
example Cohen, 1973; World Bank, 1983; Serageldin and Cohen, 1995). 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Through the analysis of patterns of path dependence and change in the history of 
institutions, this paper has shown how the political economy of the World Bank 
                                                 
24 “[I]t would be comforting to continue to believe that there is no conflict between rapid overall 
growth and comparable improvement in the incomes of the poor. But, unfortunately, in the real 
world in which we live, the evidence suggests that there is” (McNamara, 1972, p. 219). 
25 The proposal for a new approach based on “basic human needs” came from an ILO conference 
held in Geneva in 1976 (ILO, 1976, 1977). 
26 Kapur, Lewis and Webb, however, note that the overall urban development lending over the same 
period amounted to only 4 percent of total Bank lending (p. 317). 
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took shape in its formative years, and how it affected the institution’s subsequent 
developments, its strengths and weaknesses. The paper focused on housing as a 
particularly interesting case in point, representative of a broader scenario. 
In the 1970s, the Bank was eventually able to join the frontiers of the 
development debate, at least with some outstanding scholars recruited by 
McNamara. But it must not be forgotten that at the outbreak of the debate, during 
the 1960s, the Bank was bringing up the rear. 
Referring to housing, Bank publication recognized that “the World Bank Group 
entered this field, in the 1970s, as a latecomer” (World Bank, 1975, p. 6). What is 
worth analyzing thoroughly, and I have tried to do it in this paper, is why the Bank 
found itself as a latecomer, through what processes and decisions. Discussions that 
had taken place inside the institution between the 1940s and the 1950s, starting with 
the debate over the housing issue, show that from the very beginning of its 
development commitment the Bank could have cultivated a broader view on 
development issues than it actually did during the 1950s and most of the 1960s. 
Instead, the Bank consciously refused to adopt different perspectives on 
development, or, in the words of its vice-president, to consider broad economic 
policies or studies. While, on the one hand, this decision gave the institution strong 
stability, on the other hand, it stripped it of the ability to understand the changes 
that had come about in the development field during the 1960s. What McNamara 
tried to do was recover suggestions made very early in the life of the Bank, but 
which had neither been taken up nor, perhaps most importantly, incorporated into 
the institution’s cultural heritage. 
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